A new research paper on traffic information provision
下記の論文が国際誌 “Newroks and Spatial Economics” に掲載されました（豊田中央研究所の岩瀬氏・田所氏との共同研究です）．観光交通等の非日常的の移動目的が卓越している行楽地への道路において，ドライバーにどのような情報提供を行えばネットワーク全体の効率性が向上するのかを，ゲーム理論の “Belief Design Approach” と呼ばれる理論をもとに解析したものです（プレプリント版はこちらより，正式版はこちらよりご覧いただけます）．
Self-Fulfilling Signal of an Endogenous State in Network Congestion Games
By Tatsuya Iwase, Yukihiro Tadokoro, Daisuke Fukuda
We consider the problem of coordination via signaling in network congestion games to improve social welfare deteriorated by incomplete information about traffic flow. Traditional studies on signaling, which focus on exogenous factors of congestion and ignore congestion externalities, fail to discuss the oscillations of traffic flow. To address this gap, we formulate a problem of designing a coordination signal on endogenous information about traffic flow and introduce a it self-fulfilling characteristic of a signal that guarantees an outcome flow consistent with the signal itself without causing the unwanted oscillation. An instance of the self-fulfilling signal is shown in the case of a Gaussian signal distribution. In addition, we show simple numerical examples. The results reveal how a self-fulfilling signal suppresses the oscillation and simultaneously improves social welfare through improved network efficiency.
