A new research paper on traffic information provision
The following paper has been published in the international journal, “Networks and Spatial Economics” (in collaboration with Mr. Iwase and Mr. Tadokoro of Toyota Central R&D Labs). The paper is performed based on the “Belief Design Approach” of game theory and it analyzes how to improve the efficiency of the entire network by providing information to drivers on roads used for sightseeing and other non-routine travel purposes (The preprint version is available here, and the official version is available here).
Self-Fulfilling Signal of an Endogenous State in Network Congestion Games
By Tatsuya Iwase, Yukihiro Tadokoro, Daisuke Fukuda
We consider the problem of coordination via signaling in network congestion games to improve social welfare deteriorated by incomplete information about traffic flow. Traditional studies on signaling, which focus on exogenous factors of congestion and ignore congestion externalities, fail to discuss the oscillations of traffic flow. To address this gap, we formulate a problem of designing a coordination signal on endogenous information about traffic flow and introduce a it self-fulfilling characteristic of a signal that guarantees an outcome flow consistent with the signal itself without causing the unwanted oscillation. An instance of the self-fulfilling signal is shown in the case of a Gaussian signal distribution. In addition, we show simple numerical examples. The results reveal how a self-fulfilling signal suppresses the oscillation and simultaneously improves social welfare through improved network efficiency.
